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Political Geography: Special Issue on Climate
Change and Conflict
Edited by Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch
Volume 26, Issue 6, August 2007.

Reviewed by ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI
Elizabeth L. Chalecki is an adjunct professor in the International Studies program of
Boston College. She received her doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University, for her dissertation, “The CO2 Will Always Get Through:
National Security and Climate Change.”

Given that the Nobel Committee awarded its
2007 Peace Prize to former U.S. Vice President
Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), and that greenhouse
gas emissions continue to increase around the
globe, practitioners of peace and security will
have to familiarize themselves with climatic
drivers of conflict. To that end, the journal
Political Geography has devoted an entire issue
to exploring the links between climate change
and violent conflict.
In the issue’s opening article, “Climate
Change and Conflict,” Ragnhild Nordås and
Nils Petter Gleditsch lament the lack of firsthand, peer-reviewed research on climate and
conflict, noting that “statements about security implications have so far largely been based
on speculation and questionable sources” (p.
628). They cite some of the recent documents
addressing this linkage, including the paper
for the Department of Defense’s Office of Net
Assessment (Schwartz & Randall, 2003), the
Center for Naval Analysis’ 2007 report written by retired military officers, two German
reports (German Ministry of Environment,
2002; WGBU, 2007), and the recent UN
Security Council debate (UN, 2007), among
others. Nordås and Gleditsch are correct: Much
of this literature has not been peer-reviewed,
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nor was it intended to be. The links between
climate change and security are just emerging
as fertile ground for both security practitioners
and social scientists. Now, however, with world
policy attention focused on climate, they rightly
point out that these connections cannot be left
to tenuous connections in white papers.
Nordås and Gleditsch recommend that
future studies of the climate-conflict link should
better combine climate models and conflict
models, and point out an inconvenient truth
about the IPCC reports: They only peripherally
address the implications of climate change for
security and conflict. Nordås and Gleditsch also
maintain that further research on climate and
conflict should:
• Differentiate between types of violence driven by climate change, including non-state
violence;
• Recognize the capacity of humans to adapt
to the positive and negative effects of climate change;
• Take regional variations into account; and
• Focus more on climate change’s security
implications for the world’s poor.
After these common-sense recommendations, Nordås and Gleditsch veer off course
with their assumption that the world is becoming more peaceful and that the climate-conflict
connection is “self-denying” (p. 635). They
point out that conflict models assume that
the future will look like the past, and they also
note that the “current trend toward a more
peaceful world” (a trend measured only since
the end of World War II) will not be reversed.
However, the climate models, which have been

e xtensively developed and reviewed, predict the
exact opposite: The future will not look like the
past. If, as the authors recommend, climate and
conflict models should be more tightly coupled,
then the climate models must lead the way.
The second article, “Climate Change, Human
Security, and Violent Conflict,” by Jon Barnett
and W. Neil Adger, states that climate change
poses risks to human security because “the more
people are dependent on climate-sensitive forms
of natural capital…the more at risk they are from
climate change” (p. 641). However, this sensitivity is mitigated by social and political adaptive capacity, which varies by region and era. In
one of their most interesting observations, the
authors point out that climate change-driven
stresses can have a cascading effect, with failure in
one primary production sector causing a downstream industry to slow down, thus leading to a
market failure, etc. While intervening variables
are rightly identified, this cascade theory is still
particularly noteworthy because the independent
variable of climate change is the primary driver.
Barnett and Adger’s main finding is that climate change will undermine human security
in two key ways: by reducing the opportunities
people have to provide for themselves and thus
constricting their livelihoods; and by eroding
state capacity to provide the services that sustain livelihoods and therefore peace. They recommend three paths for future research, which
I believe would all help conceptually strengthen
the climate-conflict link:
• Assess the relative vulnerability of people’s
livelihoods to climate change (by region);
• Connect reduced livelihoods with violent
conflict (e.g., why do individuals choose
violence?); and
• Examine how climate threatens state
capacity.
Rafael Reuveny, in “Climate Change-Induced
Migration and Violent Conflict,” notes that
climate-induced migration appears in many climate change-to-violence scenarios. After studying the effects of other environmental problems

on migration, he adapts the standard migration
literature to the problem of environmental refugees, and argues that populations can respond
to environmental changes in one of three ways:
by staying and doing nothing; by staying and
mitigating the effects; or by leaving the area.
Reuveny examines 38 cases in which environmental factors played a role in migration,
from the Dust Bowl in the 1930s United
States to modern-day Bangladesh and Brazil.
Since less developed countries are more reliant
on the natural environment for their livelihoods, they are more vulnerable to the effects
of climate change. Environmental factors that
“push” people to migrate include degradation of arable land, droughts, deforestation,
water scarcity, floods, storms, and famines, all
of which are predicted to intensify as the climate changes. Reuveny recognizes that environmental factors do not work in isolation,
but argues that they nevertheless contribute
significantly to migration episodes. However,
“climate refugees” alone do not engender conflict; instead, conflict arises when migrants of a
different nationality or ethnicity move quickly
or in large numbers into countries that are
themselves suffering from limited resources.
Of the 38 migration cases Reuveny studied, 19
resulted in conflict.
Reuveny concludes that it will cost more
in the long term to do nothing about climate
change-induced migration than it would to formulate a policy for addressing the issue. Citing
two examples of public policy interventions in
major migrations, he concludes that government policy could help mitigate the effects of
climate change on conflict. However, he has no
specific policy recommendations for developed
countries, and warns of high costs without any
citations to back up his claims. Despite petering
out at the end, Reuveny’s article is one of the
more straightforward examinations of the links
between climate and conflict in the volume.
In “Climate Change, Environmental
Degradation, and Armed Conflict,” Clionadh
Raleigh and Henrik Urdal report on their statistical analysis of three climate change effects:

If, as the
authors
recommend,
climate and
conflict models
should be more
tightly coupled,
then the
climate models
must lead the
way.
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cropland degradation, freshwater scarcity, and
population displacement. They mapped data
on these variables over grid squares of 100 km
x 100 km across the Earth’s surface, and then
overlaid intervening variables, including economic and political factors like GDP and polity scores. Raleigh and Urdal stress that more
information can be gained by looking at subnational regions than from national averages,
since not all of a country’s territory is usually
under conflict at once, nor do environmental
stressors fall neatly within national boundaries. Hence, local resource scarcity may be a
better predictor of conflict than national-level scarcity. Most of their findings underscore
the conventional wisdom that environmental
stressors are indirect drivers of conflict, but
they do find, surprisingly, that “degradation
and scarcity variables are uniformly positively
and significantly related to conflict” in higherincome countries and less so in lower-income
states (pp. 688, 691).
The co-authors recognize that their analysis suffers from one of the key weaknesses of
statistically-based conjectures about real world
events: The statistical mean often hides substantial regional or temporal variations. Conversely,
the exclusion of information about one country or region can make an otherwise significant
result statistically insignificant. For example,
Raleigh and Urdal determine that omitting
data about Russia from one model negates the
connection between land degradation, water
scarcity, and conflict. Similarly, omitting data
about Niger from another model renders the
interaction between water scarcity and population growth insignificant. Yet it is not difficult
to imagine that, on a very local scale, these drivers would be compelling. Just because a largeN study does not find a statistically significant
relationship between two variables across an
entire sample does not mean that the relationship might prove different if examined on a
case-by-case basis.
The last two articles in the issue focus on
Africa. In “Trends and Triggers: Climate, Climate
Change, and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan
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Africa,” Cullen Hendrix and Sarah Glaser argue
that sub-Saharan Africa is especially vulnerable to
the conflict-provoking effects of climate change,
due to existing inequalities in resource access and
distribution. However, Hendrix and Glaser find
no significant correlation between rainfall and
the onset of civil war, though they do recognize
that the country-wide spatial scales they used
could mask local hotspots.
In “Environmental Influences on Pastoral
Conflict in the Horn of Africa,” Patrick Meier,
Doug Bond, and Joe Bond cross-reference conflict data gathered from on-the-ground observers in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda
with environmental indicators such as vegetation, precipitation, and forage (pasture for
grazing) in an attempt to determine whether
the latter might serve as possible harbingers of
pastoral conflict. They find that environmental
drivers are significantly correlated with the incidence of organized pastoral raids, but not with
the number of human deaths or the amount of
livestock lost.
All these articles conclude that conflict is a
complex dependent variable, and that environmental measures of climate change do not
provide sufficient explanatory power without
taking into account intervening political and
economic variables. In addition, most authors
lament the incompleteness of the available data
sets, which is only to be expected; many countries do not have the inclination or the wherewithal to gather and compile sub-national data
sets on environmental variables, and international agencies usually gather data only at the
national level.
I have two main concerns with this issue.
First, the authors overuse the principle of ceterus paribus—all other things being equal. But
when are all other things ever equal? Such a
relationship is a statistical convenience and does
not reflect the real world. Attaching too much
weight to the existence of a statistical relationship can shut down profitable avenues of inquiry into particular problems, especially if they do
not occur on a macro level. If statistical correlation is what Nordås and Gleditsch mean when

they look for “more rigorous analysis,” then
they could miss the forest for the trees.
Second, these articles generally appear
to conflate the ideas of conflict and security,
assuming that if a region or nation is free from
conflict, then by definition it must be secure.
This assumption is faulty, as a nation does not
have to engage in conflict in order to be insecure. The recent and startling data on Arctic ice
melt provides a sterling example of an emerging area of insecurity for many circumpolar
nations that has not (yet) devolved into conflict, whereas the pastoral conflict that Meier,
Bond, and Bond examine does not rise to the
level of a national security threat (though they
do not claim that it does).
What the scholarly literature on climate and
conflict needs now is not more theory or more
attempts at statistical correlation, but opportunities to test out the existing theories on a subnational scale. This issue of Political Geography
has opened the door to an upcoming and
important field of research.
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Population, Land Use, and Environment:
Research Directions
Edited by Barbara Entwistle and Paul C. Stern
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005. 321 pages.

Reviewed by DAVID L. CARR
As seen from space, land cover change is far and
away the signature imprint of human habitation on the surface of the Earth. What is driving changes in land use and the environment?
What is the role of population? In addressing
these questions, Population, Land Use, and
Environment presents the goals and research
directions of the National Research Council’s
(NRC) Panel on New Research on Population
and the Environment along with state-of-theart case studies. The three sections of this volume, edited by Barbara Entwistle and Paul C.

David Carr of the University of California,
Santa Barbara, has served as principal investigator on grants from NASA, the National
Institutes of Health, and the National Science
Foundation, and has authored more than 50
publications on land use/cover change, protected areas, migration, fertility, and health
in the tropics.

Stern, focus on land use or land cover change
where population is a prominent driving force.

117

Environmental Change and Security program

